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INTRODUCTION
The current legal regime regarding interstate recognition of same-
sex marriage is an often told and, within broad parameters, seemingly
well-settled story. It's generally presented as follows. All states follow
the venerable choice of law rule of marriage recognition, which holds
that a marriage is considered valid in any jurisdiction if it was valid in
the state of celebration, even if it would not be valid in the state where
recognition is sought. There is an equally venerable public policy
exception to the general rule, which holds that a state can refuse
recognition to a marriage validly celebrated elsewhere, if recognition
would violate a strong public policy of the state. For same-sex
marriages, that exception received a federal imprimatur when
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act' ("DOMA") in 1996,
which specifies that states are not required by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause2 to recognize same-sex marriages from other states. Motivated
in part by the passage of DOMA, most states passed legislation or
amendments to constitutions (or both), which specify that same-sex
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1. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in relevant part at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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marriages are invalid, though not all of these provisions refer to
marriages celebrated elsewhere. Even in the absence of such mini-
DOMAs, the courts of several states have refused to establish a right
to same-sex marriage as a matter of state constitutional law. All of the
latter states would seem to fall within the public policy exception to
the recognition of a same-sex marriage lawfully celebrated in another
state.3
But the story is more complicated, and the purpose of this Article
is to illuminate some of those complications and their potential
jurisprudential significance. All mini-DOMAs declare, in various
ways, that same-sex marriages are invalid, but not all explicitly
address the issue of recognition of a marriage celebrated in another
state or a foreign country. Also, a large number of states have two
mini-DOMAs, usually the result of a statute passed by the legislature,
followed by an amendment to the state constitution. Sometimes one,
but not both, of these provisions explicitly address extraterritorial
recognition of marriage. These complications have received relatively
little discussion in the literature.4
Jurisprudential questions are also raised by this richer
understanding of mini-DOMAs. If a mini-DOMA does not address a
same-sex marriage validly celebrated elsewhere, should it bar
recognition of that marriage? Should mini-DOMAs be required to
clearly state that extraterritorial marriages are invalid as well? If a
state has in effect two mini-DOMAs, and the wording is not the same,
does one have superior legal effect, or should they be harmonized? If
3. For examples of sources that relate the story, with varying degrees of
details, in the manner described, see PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 652-54
(5th ed. 2010); Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity
Versus Public Policy in Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic
Relations, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1855, 1913-14; Colleen McNichols Ramais, Note, 'Til
Death Do You Part.. .And This Time We Mean It: Denial of Access to Divorce For
Same-Sex Couples, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1013, 1015-18.
4. See, e.g., Joanne L. Grossman & Edward Stein, The State of the Same-Sex
Union: Part Two in a Three-Part Series, FINDLAW LEGAL NEWS (July 21, 2009),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090721.html (observing that some states
have multiple provisions restricting same-sex marriage); Andrew Koppleman,
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for
Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2143 (2005) (documenting different provisions within
some states, but not extensively commenting on the intrastate jurisprudential
significance of such provisions); Wardle, supra note 3, at 1913 (same).
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a state does not have a mini-DOMA of any kind, but state courts have
held that there is no state constitutional right to same-sex marriage,
should that state refuse to recognize such a marriage celebrated in
another state, on the basis of the public policy exception? These
issues, too, have received some discussion in the literature, though not
at great length.'
The purpose of this Article is to shed greater descriptive and
prescriptive light on these issues. Part II addresses the proliferation of,
and differences among, mini-DOMAs in the last two decades. It
particularly focuses on the intrastate differences in those provisions, in
states with more than one mini-DOMA, and discusses why one
provision may refer to an extraterritorial marriage, and another may
not. Part III revisits the public policy exception in light of a richer
appreciation of the development of mini-DOMAs, and the fact that
some states do not have such provisions. This part advances three
interrelated reasons for concluding that mini-DOMAs must clearly
state that extraterritorial same-sex marriages are invalid: the
appropriateness of a rebuttable presumption against construing these
provisions to affect marriages celebrated elsewhere, the import of a
law and economics approach to choice of law issues, and the
consequences of the direct democracy origins of many of the mini-
DOMAs. Part III also concludes, in contrast, that in states without
mini-DOMAs, a state court holding that, as a matter of its law, there is
no right to a same-sex marriage, can be itself sufficient to satisfy the
public policy exception. Part IV concludes the Article.6
5. See, e.g., John P. Feldmeier, Federalism and Full Faith and Credit: Must
States Recognize Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriages?, 25 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
107, 117 (Fall 1995) (discussing clear statement requirement); Joseph W. Hovermill,
A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 53 MD. L. REv. 450, 488 (1994) (arguing that
mini-DOMAs must clearly state that extraterritorial marriages are invalid); Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U.
PA. L. REv. 2215, 2240-44 (2005); see also Gary J. Simson, Beyond Interstate
Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 313, 316 n.7
(2006) (noting the position of Wolff, supra); Marriage-Whether Out-of-State
Marriage That is Valid in the State of Celebration May be Recognized in Maryland,
95 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 3, 33 (2010) (arguing for clear statement interpretation of
Maryland's mini-DOMA, in part relying on Hovermill, supra).
6. My primary focus is how to interpret certain aspects of mini-DOMAs. So,
among the matters I do not address are the constitutionality of DOMA, or of mini-
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I. THE DIFFUSION OF AND DIFFERENCES AMONG MINI-DOMAs
Forty-one states now have statutory or constitutional provisions,
or both, which in varying ways declare same-sex marriage invalid.
Not all of these provisions were passed in the wake of DOMA's
passage by Congress in 1996, but many were, and for convenience I
will refer to all of them as mini-DOMAs. Nor is the presence or
absence of a mini-DOMA necessarily coextensive with the proper
invocation of the public policy exception to the place of celebration
rule for foreign marriages. But the passage of a mini-DOMA, or more
than one, is a significant step in the direction of invoking that
exception, and that policy history will be the focus of this Part of the
Article. The next Part will consider the jurisprudential significance of
the different wording of different mini-DOMAs, as well as the
appropriate use of the public policy exception by states that do not
have such a provision.
A. Litigation and Legislation, 1970-2010
Scholars have extensively discussed the history of litigation
seeking to require states to recognize same-sex marriage and the
interrelated story of the passage of mini-DOMAs.7 Only the highlights
need be recounted here. Despite the relatively recent attention devoted
to litigation over same-sex marriage, and the passage of mini-
DOMAs, both date back forty years. Same-sex couples challenged
laws forbidding same-sex marriage in several states in the early 1970s,
but that litigation failed. A second wave of suits were filed in the early
DOMAs, or of the public policy exception itself. Likewise, I do not address other
interpretative issues regarding mini-DOMAs, such as their applicability to civil
unions celebrated in other states, to divorces of marriages celebrated elsewhere, or to
the enforcement of judgments from other states that embody recognition of a same-
sex marriage. As this Article went to press, a federal court held California law
forbidding same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The case is on appeal.
7. For recent helpful overviews, see, for example, Scott Barclay, In Search of
Judicial Activism in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases: Sorting the Evidence from
Courts, Legislatures, Initiatives and Amendments, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 111, 113-15
(2010); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1183-93 (2009); Nelson Tebbe
& Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1375, 1383-86 (2010); Ramais, supra note 3, at 1015-24.
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1990s, the most prominent of which was litigation in Hawaii that
culminated in a supreme court decision in 1993,8 which found there to
be a right to same-sex marriage. An amendment to the state
constitution overturned that decision, but litigation in other states
followed. Eventually, by 2009 the high courts of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Iowa held there was a right to same-sex marriage
under their law. The Supreme Court of California also so held, but a
referendum overturned that decision a year later. In contrast, courts in
Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Washington
held there was no such right.9
As early as 1975, presumably in reaction to the first wave of
litigation, state legislatures began passing mini-DOMAs. By the time
of the Hawaii court decision, sixteen states had already adopted some
kind of mini-DOMA. In the year after the decision, eight other states
adopted a mini-DOMA.o In the midst of the state legislative activity,
Congress passed DOMA in 1996. The principal impetus for its
passage was the Hawaii decision, and the fear that other states would
be required to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in that state.11
8. Baehr v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The court did not expressly hold
there was such a right, only that the state's denial of such a right would be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny, and remanded for further proceedings on that point. Those
further proceedings were superseded by an amendment to the state constitution.
Wardle, supra note 3, at 1859 n.13.
9. For overviews of this litigation, see Barclay, supra note 7, at 114-15; Tebbe
& Widiss, supra note 7, at 1384-85.
10. Barclay, supra note 7, at 115.
11. This is clear from the legislative history of DOMA. See H.R. Rep. No.
104-664, at 4-10 (1996) [hereinafter DOMA Legislative History] (discussing the
Hawaii litigation and its possible implications for marriage recognition in the other
forty-nine states). The dissenting members of the House Judiciary Committee
argued that DOMA was unnecessary, given that the Full Faith and Credit Clause had
historically not been applied to marriages, and that in any event the public policy
exception already empowered states not to recognize marriages from other states. Id.
at 36-40. The majority responded by arguing that the inapplicability of the Clause to
marriages was "far from certain," and that legislation was necessary to "protect" the
then-passed mini-DOMAs. Id. at 9. For further discussion of Congress's intent in
passing DOMA, see Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365 (2005).
Congress was controlled by the Republicans at the time, and given its largely
symbolic nature, its passage is sometimes described as a low-cost nod to opponents
of gay marriage. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Gay Rights and American
Constitutionalism: What's A Constitution For?, 56 DUKE L.J. 545, 555 (2006). On
109
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As already noted, DOMA stated that states were not so required as a
matter of federal law. While mini-DOMAs already existed when
Congress passed DOMA, others were passed in the wake of the
federal law. By.the mid-1990s, the issue of same-sex marriage had
been seized upon by politicians and religious and interest groups of
various ideological persuasions, and conservative interest groups
mobilized state legislatures to pass mini-DOMAs. 12 But the passage
of DOMA had a catalytic effect as it "helped to crystallize, in the eyes
of many supporters, the pressing need for legislation on same-sex
marriage."l 3 By 1998, thirty-eight states had adopted a mini-DOMA.14
A second wave of mini-DOMA passage began in the late 1990s.
Between 1998 and 2008, there were popular initiatives in thirty
states-this time amending state constitutions by adding language
declaring same-sex marriages invalid.' 5 With one exception, all of the
initiatives passed, most by considerable margins.1 6 The exception was
Arizona, where the initiative failed by a slim margin in 2006; in 2008,
another initiative passed in that state.' 7 Most of these states already
had mini-DOMAs on the books. Why was another one necessary?
Undoubtedly, the reasons varied from state to state, but the primary
the other hand, the Democratic President, Bill Clinton, signed the law, purportedly
reluctantly, but then touted the passage of DOMA during his 1996 presidential re-
election campaign. JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES
FROM WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE 373-74 (2005).
12. See generally Donald P. Haider-Markel, Policy Diffusion as a
Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage
Bans in the 1990s, 1 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 5 (2001); Donald P. Haider-Markel,
Lesbian and Gay Politics in the States: Interest Groups, Electoral Politics, and
Policy, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 290 (Craig A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D.
Wald & Clyde Wilcox, eds., 2000) [hereinafter Haider-Markel, Lesbian and Gay
Politics in the States].
13. Sarah A. Soule, Going to the Chapel? Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the
United States, 1973-2000, 51 SOC. PROBS. 453, 467 (2004).
14. Barclay, supra note 7, at 112 tbl.1.
15. KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 209 (2009);
Rory McVeigh & Maria-Elena D. Diaz, Voting to Ban Same-Sex Marriage:
Interests, Values, and Communities, 74 AM. Soc. REV. 891, 891 (2009).
16. See MILLER, supra note 15, at 209-11 & tbls.7.1 & 7.2; McVeigh & Diaz,
supra note 15, at 891-92 & tbl.1.
17. MILLER, supra note 15, at 209; McVeigh & Diaz, supra note 15, at 891-92.
Of the thirty-one initiatives, nineteen were placed on the ballot by legislatures, while
voters placed twelve on the ballot. MILLER, supra note 15, at 209.
[Vol. 41
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rationale was to constitutionalize the prior mini-DOMA; not only
would the provision then be harder to repeal-as opposed to a mere
statute-but proponents could not use the state constitution as a
potential source of legal authorization of same-sex marriage.1 Not
coincidentally, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in a highly
publicized decision in 2003, held that there was a state constitutional
right to same-sex marriage. 19 Twelve of the initiatives were on the
ballot in 2004, and it seems they were meant to coincide with the 2004
Presidential election and mobilize conservatives who otherwise might
not vote. 20
B. Intrastate Differences Among Mini-DOMAs
While the passage of the mini-DOMAs from the early 1990s to
the mid-2000s was the result, in part, of coordinated activity by
national conservative interest groups and their affiliates and allies in
particular states,21 it did not result in uniform language among the
18. Schacter, supra note 7, at 1188-89; Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 565, 569-
70. For further discussion of these provisions, see Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher,
Said and Unsaid: State Legislative Signaling to State Courts over Same Sex
Marriage 1990-2004, 30 LAW & POL'Y 254 (2008); Arthur Lupia et al., Why State
Constitutions Differ in Their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage, 72 J. POL. 122
(2010).
19. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
20. MILLER, supra note 15, at 209-11. Scholars have described the 2004
initiatives as a backlash against Goodridge, suggesting that the decision ultimately
redounded to the nationwide detriment of supporters of same-sex marriage. E.g.,
Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431
(2005); Schacter, supra note 7, at 1156; cf Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime,
Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1235 (2010) (arguing against
backlash thesis regarding developments in California); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond
Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 151 (2009) (arguing that the backlash thesis has been overstated). It is
not clear that conservative voters were in fact mobilized by the 2004 and 2006
initiatives in the way apparently desired by many supporters of those measures. For
discussion of that point, see David E. Campbell & J. Quin Monson, The Religion
Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Election, 72 PuB. OP. Q. 399 (2008); Michael J.
Ensley & Erik P. Bucy, Do Candidate Positions Matter? The Effect of the Gay
Marriage Question on Gubernatorial Elections, 38 AM. POL. RES. 142 (2010).
21. See Haider-Markel, Lesbian and Gay Politics in the States, supra note 12,
at 307-11 (discussing various conservative interest groups that worked in favor of
same-sex marriage bans in the states in the 1990s); Soule, supra note 13, at 460-61
111
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mini-DOMAs. A full exploration of these language differences is not
necessary here; what is pertinent is the presence or absence of
language in mini-DOMAs that addresses extraterritorial marriage. As
noted, by the late 1990s, states enacted over thirty such provisions.
Most were in the form of statutes passed by the legislature. 22 Of those,
five did not have language that specifically declared marriages
performed in other states invalid.23 In the second wave of passage
between 1998 and 2008, states enacted thirty initiatives, all amending
constitutions. As of 2010, forty-one states have one or more statutory
or constitutional provision limiting same-sex marriage.24 Of the
second-wave provisions, twenty-four2 5 did not have language that
(same).
22. Schacter, supra note 7, at 1185. Four states amended their constitutions:
Alaska (1998), Hawaii (1998), Nebraska (2000), and Nevada (2002). Id. at 1186 &
n.201.
23. The five states are Illinois, Maryland, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. While South Carolina's mini-DOMA, passed by statute in 1996, had no
clear statement of extraterritorial effect, the constitutional amendment by initiative
in 2006 did. For the numbers reported in this paragraph, I rely on three sources: the
appendix in Koppelman, supra note 4, at 2166-94 (providing operative language
from all mini-DOMAs from all states up to 2005); Ramais, supra note 3, at 1023
(compiling additional information on mini-DOMAs up to 2010); and state-by-state
laws compiled by the Human Rights Campaign, Marriage and Relationship
Recognition, http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage/marriagelaws.asp (last visited
June 1, 2010). Since lists of mini-DOMAs vary in the literature, depending largely
on when counts are being made and what is being counted, I supply my own list in
the Appendix to this Article.
24. Wardle, supra note 3, at 1913.
25. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The convoluted history of California law is worth mentioning. That state passed an
initiative banning same-sex marriage in 2000 with no clear statement language, and
the state supreme court declared that initiative unlawful in In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). That decision was overturned by the passage of
Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment in 2008, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, which
itself survived a constitutional challenge in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009). Proposition 8 did not have a clear statement, but legislation passed in
California late in 2009, codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2004 & Supp.
2010), was meant to codify Proposition 8 and recognize same-sex marriages,
celebrated in California or elsewhere, prior to Nov. 4, 2008. Same-sex marriages
celebrated after that date outside of California will only be considered domestic
partnerships. See Ramais, supra note 3, at 1021; see also Cummings & NeJaime,
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specifically targeted same-sex marriages celebrated in other states. In
nineteen states, the second provision did not have any such language,
while the earlier passed provision did. In those nineteen, there is an
arguable conflict or ambiguity in state law regarding the legality of
extraterritorial same-sex marriage.26 At the end of both waves of
passage, there are nine states that have passed mini-DOMAs that do
not clearly state that they apply to extraterritorial marriages.27
Given that the impetus for many of the mini-DOMAs was the
professed fear that Hawaii and Massachusetts, after court decisions in
those states in 1993 and 2003, respectively, would become meccas for
same-sex couples to evade their home state's law, it might seem
curious that all of the mini-DOMAs do not routinely refer to the
invalidity of out-of-state marriages. There is less curiosity for the first
wave of mini-DOMAs; only eight of the thirty-eight initiatives lack
such language. More curious are the second wave of initiatives. Eighty
percent of those lack such language, and odder still, 19 of those
initiatives, in effect, constitutionalized prior statutes that did expressly
invalidate marriages celebrated elsewhere.
Compelling explanations for these intrastate disparities do not
easily come to mind. With regard to the first wave, perhaps the
drafters did not think clear language on marriages from other states
was necessary, since the public policy exception against recognition
might apply even in the absence of such language. Whether that is a
sound interpretation of the prevailing law is discussed in the next Part.
The same reason might also explain the larger number of mini-
DOMAs in the second wave that did not have such language. The
political context of the latter provisions might have some explanatory
force. As potential constitutional provisions, intended at least in part
to mobilize voters for concurrent elections for national or statewide
supra note 20, at 1297 (noting that Strauss left open the issue of the effect of its
holding on extraterritorial marriages). As this article went to press, a federal court
held Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The case is on appeal.
26. The nineteen states are those in the preceding footnote, less Hawaii,
Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon, where there were initiatives not preceded by a
statute, and less South Dakota, where neither mini-DOMA had clear statement
language.
27. The nine states are Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
113
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political office, perhaps the drafters intentionally kept the initiatives
short and to the point. References to an extraterritorial marriage might
have been thought to be confusing to voters, or even
counterproductive to the initiative's mission. Perhaps it was thought
that some voters, while willing to ban same-sex marriage in their own
state, might be less interested in (or even disagree with) denying that
right to couples who go elsewhere to get married, or who are from
elsewhere and move to the forum after a same-sex marriage.28 In most
states, initiatives are legally required to only address a single subject, 29
and this may have also led to the brevity of some of the second-wave
provisions. 30
Perhaps the differences in wording can be largely explained
simply due to the peculiarities of drafting statutes and initiatives
within each state. A full exploration of the drafting history of these
28. There have been many polls on same-sex marriage and related issues-for
example, Paul R. Brewer & Clyde Wilcox, The Polls-Trends: Same-Sex Marriage
and Civil Unions, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 599 (2005)-but I am unaware of any evidence
that directly reveals what voters might have thought about interstate recognition of
marriage. Professor Schacter has reported that polls have tested this question,
Schacter, supra note 7, at 1195 (noting that a poll question asked "whether other
states should recognize a same-sex marriage performed in Massachusetts"), but the
source she cites for that proposition, id. at 1195 n.265 (citing Karlyn Bowman &
Adam Foster, Attitudes About Homosexuality and Gay Marriage, AM. ENTER. INST.,
26, 29, 33, 35 (June 3, 2008), http://www.aei.org/paper/14882), by my reading does
not report or discuss a poll question that directly addresses the interstate recognition
issue.
29. For discussions of the single-subject rule for initiatives, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 541-42 (4th ed. 2007); Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of
Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 704-08
(2010).
30. E-mail from Donald P. Haider-Markel, Professor of Political Science,
University of Kansas, to Michael E. Solimine, Professor of Law, University of
Cincinnati College of Law (October 21, 2009, 12:38 EST) (on file with author). The
second wave of mini-DOMAs led to some legal challenges on single-subject rule
grounds on the basis that some of them also rendered invalid same-sex civil unions,
in addition to marriages. E.g., O'Kelly v. Cox, 604 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. 2004);
McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783 N.W.2d 855 (Wis. 2010). For further discussion of
such challenges, see Glen Staszewski, The Bait and Switch in Direct Democracy,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 17; Kurt G. Kastorf, Comment, Logrolling Gets Logrolled:
Same-Sex Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single-Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J.
1633 (2005).
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provisions within each state is beyond the scope of this Article.
Whatever the intent of the drafters of, or the voters in favor of, these
provisions, the lack of clear language affecting out-of-state marriages
in some of the provisions arguably has jurisprudential consequences,
as the next Part will explore.
III. APPLYING THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION IN THE PRESENCE OR
ABSENCE OF MINI-DOMAS
The public policy exception in choice of law has had a tortuous
and contentious history. It has been an exception to the normal rules
under both the older territorial approach and modem choice of law
theories. If choice of law principles, whatever they are, require the
application of the law of another jurisdiction, the exception permits
the forum to apply its own law if the foreign law would in some
manner violate the forum's public policy.31 The inevitable problem
has been to define and cabin the exception, since if applied
expansively, the exception would swallow the rules, and all choice of
law decisions would devolve into lex fori. Most courts did this by
emphasizing that they would apply the exception narrowly; a mere
difference in the law would not be sufficient; and the forum law must
be of a strong or important character. Even so, it is common ground
that the exception was both difficult to describe in theory and apply in
a coherent and principled way in practice.32
These difficulties attended the application of the public policy
exception in the marriage context. Courts have long struggled with
defining how different the marriage rules of the forum must be from
those of the place of celebration to invoke the exception. A full
31. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) (referring to the
"strong public policy of the forum"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 90 (1971) (same).
32. For general discussion of the public policy exception, see DAVID P.
CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 76-79 (8th ed. 2010); HAY, supra note 3, at 168-
71; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 118-25 (6th
ed. 2010); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972-76 (1997).
33. For general discussion, see HAY, supra note 3, at 628-38; WEINTRAUB,
supra note 32, at 333-39; Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law,
and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 944-62 (1998); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex
"Marriage" and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 48-55
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exploration of those struggles is unnecessary here. The focus of the
first portion of this Part of the Article is one factor relevant to the
interpretation of mini-DOMAs, and the corollary of the absence of
such a provision: how specific should forum law be regarding an out-
of-state marriage in order to invoke the exception? This Part will then
address two factors not the subject of extensive discussion in prior
literature: the impact of a law and economics analysis on interstate
marriage recognition, and the jurisprudential significance of the
juridical origins of most of the second wave of mini-DOMAs in the
initiative process, as opposed to the legislature.
A. Forum Law and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect
With respect to interstate recognition of marriage, courts could
draw on any number of sources for the proposition that the foreign
marriage violated the public policy of the forum. This could include
natural law, common law, and forum statutes defining what
relationships did or did not constitute a lawful marriage. Courts in
different states addressed these issues in different ways. One of the
splits in authority concerned the interpretation of marriage statutes. If
a marriage lawfully celebrated elsewhere would have violated statutes
of the forum if celebrated there, was that enough to justify the forum
invoking the public policy exception? Or, to apply the exception, must
the forum statutes also clearly state that their requirements or
prohibitions applied to marriages celebrated elsewhere? 34
(1998).
34. For discussion of the different approaches courts took on this issue, see
WEINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 334-35 & nn.6-12; Joanne L. Grossman,
Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84
ORE. L. REV. 433, 466 & nn.164-68 (2005); Wolff, supra note 5, at 2241; DOMA
Legislative History, supra note 11, at 39. As Professor Grossman details, when
addressing this issue many courts have also explicitly or implicitly taken into
account other factors, such as whether one or both marriage partners were
attempting to evade the marriage requirements of a state. Grossman, supra, at 460-
66. To a degree, this debate could be largely, though not completely, mooted by the
universal or widespread adoption of a separate marriage evasion statute. Such a
statute could state that parties, ineligible to marry in the forum, who left the forum to
lawfully marry elsewhere, would not have their marriages recognized as lawful
when they returned to the forum. Such statutes would in effect supply a clear
statement of extraterritorial effect for all provisions of the forum's marriage laws.
But they would not necessarily render the entire issue moot; in a mobile society
[Vol. 41
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Two well-known cases illustrate the debate. In Lanham v.
Lanham,35 the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced the validity of a
marriage properly celebrated in Michigan. The parties, citizens of
Wisconsin, travelled to Michigan to get married and then returned, but
the marriage was arguably invalid, since one of the parties had not
waited the requisite time under Wisconsin statutes after a divorce to
remarry. The Wisconsin statute did not specifically reference a
marriage that might occur out-of-state.36 Addressing the scope of the
public policy exception, the court stated that the intention of the
legislature to give "extraterritorial effect to its laws . . . must ... be
quite clear." 37 Properly understood, the court continued that clarity
was achieved here. It would "ascribe practical imbecility to the
lawmaking power" to assume that the Wisconsin legislators would
have intended the law to be easily evaded by going into a neighboring
state to be married.3 8 The terms of the statute were "broad and
sweeping [with] no limitation as to the place of the pretended
marriage.... [It] seems unquestionably intended to control the
conduct of residents of the state, whether they be [sic] within or
outside of its boundaries."39
The court in In re May 's Estate40 used a different approach.
There, the New York Court of Appeals was asked to validate a
marriage between two New York citizens, an uncle and his niece,
valid under the law of Rhode Island where they went to celebrate it,
but in violation of a New York statute. 4 1 The court held the marriage
valid, in part because the New York statute "does not by express terms
regulate a marriage solemnized in another State," and the "statute's
courts can be confronted, in a variety of circumstances, with the issue of recognition
of a foreign marriage, other than when citizens of the forum leave to get married and
return. The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1912, was one such provision, but it only five
states fully adopted it, and has since been withdrawn. HAY, supra note 3, at 637-38;
Simson, supra note 5, at 334 n.80.
35. 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908).
36. Id. at 788.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 789.
39. Id.
40. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
41. Id. at 4-5.
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scope should not be extended by judicial construction."4 2 The court
continued that the legislature could have added language to the statute,
making it clear that it applied to marriages celebrated elsewhere. 3
Both courts agreed that the issue was one of statutory
interpretation, and that a statute could only apply to an extraterritorial
marriage if the legislature so intended. Where the courts parted
company was on what presumptive interpretive canon was
appropriate: should courts presume that statutes that are silent or
ambiguous on extraterritorial effect apply to marriages celebrated
elsewhere? There is respectable authority supporting both sides.44 The
answer is relevant to the interpretation of mini-DOMAs, some of
which do not refer to extraterritorial marriages. Similarly, scholars
have weighed in on both sides of this point as well.45
In my view, the better argument is to require mini-DOMAs to
clearly state46 that they apply to marriages celebrated in another
42. Id. at 6-7. The court rejected the other reason advanced for
nonrecognition-that natural law principles forbade the marriage. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 7. The court added that "examples of such legislation are not
wanting," citing for that proposition "2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 129.6, p. 681,
and statutes there collated." Id. at 7 n. 1.
44. For support of a presumption of extraterritorial effect in marriage cases,
see HAY, supra note 3, at 633 & n.13 (endorsing presumption of Lanham);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134 (1934) (providing for public policy
exception without requiring clear statement of extraterritorial effect, though not
directly addressing the issue); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
283(2)(1971) (same). For support of a clear statement requirement in this context,
see WEINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 334-35 (discussing though questioning cases that
apply this requirement).
45. For support for presuming that all mini-DOMAs apply to extraterritorial
marriages, see Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 263 (2006) (American Law in the 21st
Century: U.S. National Reports to the XVIIth International Congress of
Comparative Law) (a mini-DOMA is a "strong statement of public policy");
Simson, supra note 5, at 332 (arguing that May's Estate interpretation of the positive
law exception "stripped it of any independent significance and rendered it
superfluous"); Wardle, supra note 3, at 1914 (agreeing with Hay, supra). For
support for presuming that mini-DOMAs do not have an extraterritorial effect, see
the authorities cited supra note 5.
46. In what follows, I assume the general correctness of courts adopting and
applying clear statement rules of statutory construction in appropriate situations.
There is a lively debate, at least at the federal level, of the propriety of courts
fashioning such clear statement rules. For an overview of the debate, see John F.
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jurisdiction. One reason is that it is a way to cabin the reach of the
public policy exception. That exception, as already noted,47 has had a
long and controversial history in choice of law theory. Other than
simply doing away with it entirely,4 8 the exception, to the extent its
basis is statutes passed by the forum state, can be limited by the
requirement that the state legislature intended that it apply to
extraterritorial events. Indeed, such a requirement will largely do
away with a freestanding public policy exception based on state
statutes that are silent or ambiguous on their extraterritorial effect.
Unlike others,4 9 I would not lament this result. The history of the
public policy exception has been marked by judicial efforts to limit its
scope; placing responsibility on state legislatures to clearly articulate
the intended geographic scope of statutes is an appropriate
continuation of that response.5 0 The clear statement requirement is
Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399,
402-03 (2010) (observing that critics argue that such rules intrude upon legislative
prerogatives, since they require courts to depart from the most natural readings of
statutes, while supporters view them as healthy means of enhancing legislative
responsibilities in sensitive areas). I agree with Manning that "clear statement rules
do impose something of a clarity tax upon legislative proceedings in particular areas,
which would seem to demand a justification other than the raw expression of
judicial value preferences." Id. at 403. While not exclusively drawing such
justifications from the U.S. Constitution (as apparently would Manning) or state
constitutions, I present, in what follows, reasons for a clear statement requirement in
the present context, without purporting to set out a general theory of clear statement
canons of interpretation.
47. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 118-24 (arguing that the exception
is of limited if any relevance when a court uses modem choice of law theories,
focusing on the interests of the respective states); Kramer, supra note 32 (arguing
that the exception is unconstitutional). This is not to say that the exception lacks
defenders-in the marriage recognition context or otherwise. See, e.g., Myers, supra
note 33; Richard S. Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictional
Recognition of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 531
(2005) [hereinafter Myers, Public Policy Doctrine]; Wardle, supra note 3; see also
authorities cited infra note 62.
49. E.g., Simson, supra note 5, at 332.
50. In these observations, I am not drawing on a distinction that the Supreme
Court has often made between the appropriate extraterritorial effect of state statutes
and state court decisions. Compare, for example, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion) (under Due Process Clause, state court can
apply forum law when state has contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and
119
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rebuttable, since a state legislature can always revisit the legislation
once a court (or anyone else) brings the issue of extraterritorial effect
to its attention.
A second, related reason is that almost all state jurisprudence on
choice of law is and historically has been judge-made. State
legislatures rarely address choice of law issues by statute, and by
default leave it to state courts to resolve such issues on a case-by-case
basis.5 I Given this practice, it makes sense to interpret state statutes on
the basis that they are not meant to apply in an extraterritorial way,
absent statutory language or other indicia of legislative intent to the
52contrary. This assumption is especially justified in the context of
the occurrence or transaction) with Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-46
(1982) (Dormant Commerce Clause limits extraterritorial effect of state statutes).
For a useful overview and critique of the distinction, see Katherine Florey, State
Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle
in Choice ofLaw and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2009).
In choice of law circles, in the same-sex marriage context or otherwise,
commentators often do not make any such distinction in evaluating the propriety of
the public policy exception. E.g., Simson, supra note 5, at 318 n.13. In any event,
the distinction is of limited relevance to the present discussion, since Congress in
DOMA has in effect authorized states to legislate on this topic in an extraterritorial
way. Assuming DOMA is constitutional, an issue I do not address in this article, see
supra note 6, Congress is an appropriate national institution with a repository of
power to allow states to take different positions on the contested issue of interstate
recognition of same-sex marriage. See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1532-36 (2007); Mark D. Rosen,
"Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Consid-
erations of States' Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 713, 752-53 (2007).
51. See Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in
Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1170 (2000); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-of-
Law Statutes, 44 TENN. L. REV. 951, 951 (1977); Simson, supra note 5, at 334.
52. Lindsay Traylor Braunig, Note, Statutory Interpretation in a Choice of
Law Context, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1050, 1053-54 (2005). A clear statement rule
against extraterritorial effect of state statutes has a long jurisprudential history in
conflicts of laws. Consider that it was applied in the canonical case of Ala. Great S.
R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So.2d 803 (Ala. 1892) (holding that Alabama statute regulating
torts did not apply to injury of an Alabama citizen suffered in another state).
Statutory law also contains such clear statement rules. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) ("Congress ordinarily legislates with
respect to domestic, not foreign affairs."). While clear statement rules typically can
only be satisfied by statutory text, the presence of legislative history or other
evidence of the intent of the enacting legislature could, in my view, satisfy the
requirement, ensuring that the body has presumably considered and addressed the
16
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mini-DOMAs. These provisions were passed in the context of a great
deal of publicity given to the progress of litigation seeking same-sex
marriage recognition in several states, and the passage of DOMA
itself.53 In these circumstances, the issues of the legality of same-sex
marriage and their interstate recognition was in some manner surely
on the public policy agenda of all state legislatures. It would not be
unfair to place the burden on those legislatures to squarely address the
issue, if they care to do so.54
B. The Law and Economics ofInterpreting Mini-DOMs
Law and Economics scholarship has, comparatively speaking,
only recently begun to address choice of law issues. 5 For present
purposes, the branch of that scholarship that addresses federalism is
most relevant to interstate recognition of marriage. Functional and
economic theories of federalism posit that states are valuable law
providers in a federation, since they can check the aggrandizement of
power by the national government. Such decentralization of power
makes it more likely that the diverse interests of different people can
be better served by smaller governmental units. Different policies
pursued by different governmental units can serve as "laboratories of
experimentation," which can redound to the benefit of other states and
the national government itself.56
issue of extraterritorial effect.
53. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into
Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1674-91 (2010) (discussing publicity surrounding same-sex
marriage legislation and litigation); Grossman, supra note 34, at 446-51 (same); Ralf
Michaels, After the Revolution-Decline and Return of U.S. Conflict of Laws, 11 Y.B.
PRIVATE INT'L L. 11, 16 (2009) (noting unusual interest group focus on conflict of
laws in the same-sex marriage debate).
54. I would be willing to temper this conclusion if, in a particular state, the
case law was clear that in the marriage recognition context, ambiguous or silent state
statutes were presumed to have an extraterritorial effect. A consideration of each
state's law on that point is beyond the scope of this Article, but the law appears to
have been and remains uncertain on that point in many states. Many if not most
states, it appears, followed a presumption against an extraterritorial effect in this
context. See supra notes 5 and 34.
55. For an overview, see RalfMichaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law,
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer 2008).
56. For summaries of the vast literature on American federalism, discussing
121
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These principles suggest that states should generally define
marriage. Historically, states have drawn from local community
values, rather than national norms, in defining marriage. States differ
among (and within) themselves with regard to a host of economic,
political, religious and other demographic characteristics, and it is
unnecessary and inappropriate for a national solution to marriage
definition to be imposed. The concept of interjurisdictional
competition, or competitive federalism, places these conclusions in
sharper focus. This theory posits that states in a federation can
compete to supply goods and services, and the law itself. Citizens
unhappy with the goods supplied can vote with their feet by exiting
that jurisdiction and going to another. This movement creates a
resulting market in law, which in theory should allocate activity
among different jurisdictions and satisfy the tastes of different people,
in an efficient way, making national uniform rules unnecessary and
unproductive. This model depends on a number of assumptions,
including the assumption that citizens can literally exit a jurisdiction,
or at least escape the effect of its laws if they stay. The model also
depends on the assumption that a state, through its law, cannot impose
negative externalities on other states, but must instead internalize the
costs of its laws. If these assumptions are satisfied, then the
competition is regarded as a beneficial race to the top. If they are not,
these and other virtues of federalism, see, for example, Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the
Uses and Limits ofLaw: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998). For
skeptical appraisals of the values of federalism, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE
(2008); Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002);
Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481 (2004).
57. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787,
1875-79 (1995); Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1703, 1740-95; Wilkinson,
supra note 11, at 559-60; see also Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in
the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367,
382-83 (2009) (finding that public policies of states on same-sex marriage,
adoptions by gays, and other gay rights issues is generally congruent with the
majoritarian preferences (as measured by polls) in those states). Of course, many
critics and supporters of same-sex marriage argue that a national solution is
ultimately necessary. See, e.g., Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage
Amendment and Rule by Judges, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 543 (2004). They
disagree on the national solution.
[Vol. 41
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then interjurisdictional competition can degenerate into a race to the
bottom.
Under this model, jurisdictions are inevitably asked to decide
whether to apply or recognize the law of other jurisdictions. To
optimize competitive federalism, choice of law rules should facilitate
individual choice of the law of different jurisdictions, while preserving
a role for beneficial governmental regulation. 59 These principles have
been applied to interstate recognition of marriage. To attract revenue
from tourism and for other reasons, states compete to celebrate
marriages. Couples may travel to different states, at least in part, due
to the laws permitting marriage. It is relatively easy for people to go to
other states to get married, even if that is the only reason they would
go there.60 Granted, conferring the legal status of marriage can have
spillover effects in other states. It will affect not only the married
couple, but potentially the relatives and others in the state where the
58. The classic formulation of the model is found in Charles Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). For helpful overviews
of the model, see ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 19-36
(2009); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86
GEO. L.J. 201 (1997). As is often observed, especially when it is difficult to measure
spillovers, whether there is a race to the top or the bottom often turns on a normative
judgment of the state regulation at issue. Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L.
REv. 1551, 1572 (2000) (commenting on proper characterization of the effect of the
passage of DOMA).
59. O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 51, at 1152-53.
60. To make the individual choice of law for marriage even easier, some have
proposed that states treat marriages like contracts, and that couples be permitted to
apply the law of another jurisdiction in a choice of law clause in the contract. Brian
H. Bix, State Interests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and Choice of Law, 38
CREIGHTON L. REv. 337, 347 (2005); O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 51, at 1209. In
theory, couples could even formalize such a contract online. See Adam Candeub &
Mae Kuykendall, E-marriage: Breaking the Marriage Monopoly (Mich. State Univ.
Coll. of Law Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 07-25, 2010), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract--1491704. To be sure, the conventional understanding, as
reflected in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971), is that
the forum may refuse to enforce a choice of law clause if the chosen law would
violate the forum's public policy. See Myers, Public Policy Doctrine, supra note 48,
at 541-45. But the law and economic critique calls for limits to the exception in
these circumstances, since it undermines the efficacy of parties choosing the law.
E.g., O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 209-10.
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couple is from or resides after the marriage, if different from the state
of celebration. But these effects are difficult to quantify, and the
positive and negative externalities of recognizing marriage may cancel
out in different states. In these circumstances, scholars have argued
that, as a general matter, the competition among states to confer the
status of marriage is a race to the top. 6 1
Others and I argue that the optimal choice of law rule for marriage
recognition, from a competitive federalism perspective, is the current
place of celebration rule, with the public policy exception. 62 The
celebration rule permits prospective marriage couples to choose the
law to govern that status, while the public policy exception permits a
state to enforce its own regulatory interests, should it care to do so.
The problem is the scope of the exception from an interjurisdictional
perspective. I have further argued that the public policy exception in
this context should be narrowly focused. Ways to achieve such a
focus include requiring that the exception be grounded in a state
statute, not merely state common law, and that the statute clearly
indicate that it applies to extraterritorial marriages.63 A broad reading
of the exception would undermine the individual choice that is crucial
to the success of the model. But having no exception at all improperly
assumes that the state being asked to recognize a foreign marriage has
no regulatory interests in the possible interstate spillover effects
generated by that marriage. 64
61. Bix, supra note 60, at 337-40; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 58, at 266-
67; Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of
Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 83, 88-90 (1998).
62. Rensberger, supra note 57, at 1800-03; Solimine, supra note 61, at 97-99;
see also Bix, supra note 58, at 347.
63. Solimine, supra note 61, at 98-99. O'Hara and Ribstein similarly argue
that, from a competitive federalism perspective, states should not be able to use
statutes to give content to a public policy exception unless the legislature clearly
states that it is meant to limit contractual choice-of-law clauses. O'HARA &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 209-11. Elsewhere, though, they endorse the place of
celebration as the appropriate choice of law rule to recognize same-sex marriages,
apparently without the public policy exception. But they acknowledge state policy
against same-sex marriage by suggesting a "compromise solution," whereby states
would enforce foreign marriages, distinguishing "incidents of marriage that the
parties can replicate by contract or other private arrangement from benefits that
states provide to encourage people to marry." Id. at 165 (citation omitted). States
could deny the latter benefits to same-sex couples married elsewhere. Id.
64. For functional social policy arguments against recognition of same-sex
[Vol. 41
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For the issues that concern the present Article, these principles
mean that the public policy exception for same-sex marriages should
be confined to mini-DOMAs, and that for the exception to apply,
those provisions must clearly state that they apply to extraterritorial
marriages.65 So, application of the competitive federalism model leads
to the same result advanced in the previous section.
marriage and civil unions, see Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions:
Some Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 401,
429-41 (2002) (arguing that official recognition of same-sex relationships will
devalue traditional marriage and family, which will have deleterious effects on
society); Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a
Woman, 83 N.D. L. REv. 1365, 1371-78 (2007) (same). But see Laura Langbein &
Mark A. Yost, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage and Negative Externalities, 90 Soc. SCI. Q.
292 (2009) (finding that adverse rates of marriage, divorce, abortion, and other
issues were not associated with states permitting gay marriage, but not examining
interstate externality issue). Granted, the positive or negative externalities associated
with interstate recognition of same-sex marriage are difficult to quantify, as they are
for other marriages. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. But the difficulties in
measurement do not make it inappropriate for a state to have the option of not giving
a subjective stamp of approval to a same-sex marriage from another state. O'HARA
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 164-65 ("[M]arriage resists the choice-of-law solution
because it is a subject in which society as a whole, and not merely the spouses, is
deeply interested.") (citation omitted); Koppelman, supra note 33, at 941
(explaining that a state has a particular interest in regulating the marriage status of
its domiciliaries); Solimine, supra note 61, at 89 n.23 (discussing a state refusing to
give its stamp of approval in this context).
65. Solimine, supra note 61, at 98. A consequence of my analysis is that it
leads to the embarrassing conclusion that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
holding interracial marriage bans unconstitutional, was wrongly decided, at least on
the facts of that case. The Lovings were an interracial couple from Virginia, which
had a statute that banned such marriages, and it specifically referenced
extraterritorial marriages. They married in the District of Columbia, which had no
such laws, and were prosecuted when they returned to Virginia. Id. at 2-4. 1 earlier
suggested that this result does not undermine the appropriateness of the competitive
federalism model for marriage recognition. Given the history of racial subordination
in this country, one could argue that a national solution to the validity of interracial
marriage bans was appropriate. Alternatively, one might argue that to refuse to
enforce a foreign marriage, a state should need to show actual evidence of negative
externalities. It is most difficult to argue that such evidence was present in Loving.
See Solimine, supra note 61, at 98-99.
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C Mini-DOMAs and Judicial Interpretation of the Products ofDirect
Democracy
There is a third reason mini-DOMAs should be interpreted in a
narrow manner, including the assumption that extraterritorial
marriages are not covered unless clearly stated. Recall that the first
wave of mini-DOMAs was mostly comprised of statutes passed by
legislatures in the 1990s. The mini-DOMAs in the large second wave
were enacted by popular initiatives, amending state constitutions. A
number of the latter, unlike most of the former, did not refer to
extraterritorial marriages.66 The enactments raise interrelated
interpretative problems. In states with two mini-DOMAs, the second
of which does not refer to extraterritorial marriages, should the second
provision in some manner preempt the first provision? Should
initiatives in any state, silent on extraterritorial marriage, nonetheless
be interpreted to apply to such marriages? How, if at all, should the
fact that the second wave of mini-DOMAs came to be enacted via
initiatives affect their interpretation by courts?
The argument that the juridical origin of the second wave of mini-
DOMAs should affect their interpretation starts with the history of
initiatives and referenda, 67 which together constitute the principal
tools of popular or direct democracy. At the turn of the last century,
Populist and Progressive forces became disenchanted by what they
saw as the capture of government in general, and state legislatures in
particular, by business associations and other interest groups, and
supported the use of tools of direct democracy to combat that
influence. 68 While adopted in many states, these devices were used
relatively rarely in most jurisdictions during much of the twentieth
66. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
67. The initiative is a method whereby an amendment to a state constitution is
placed for approval on a state-wide ballot. Initiatives may be direct (placed on the
ballot after a requisite number of signatures are obtained) or indirect (first submitted
to the state legislature for approval, and only placed on the ballot if the legislature
refuses to pass it). The referendum is a method that permits the electorate to approve
or disapprove a law proposed or passed by the legislature. Twenty-seven states
provide for the initiative, referendum or both methods. ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at
523-24; MILLER, supra note 15, at 35-36.
68. For a useful historical overview, see MILLER, supra note 15, at 23-35.
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century. A revival in use came in the last three decades, covering a
wide range of topics from political reform, morality, taxation,
education, and other issues.69 The adoption of mini-DOMAs by
initiative in the past fifteen years is another example of that revival.
Many observers have criticized this revival. Among other things,
they argue that the initiative and referenda often undermines
representative government by limiting the discretion and authority of
elected officials. Simplistic or poorly drafted initiatives can replace
the necessary deliberation and compromise over issues that are
characteristic of legislative decision-making. Public campaigns for or
against these measures can themselves be dominated by special
interests. Some remodeling by initiative of the political process itself,
such as the widespread adoption of term limits, has in the minds of
many hardly been an unqualified success. Some initiatives, some
argue, threaten individual or minority rights.70 Other observers offer a
less bleak assessment of the initiative. They argue that initiatives can
lead to greater turnout, voters are more informed than sometimes
thought when considering initiatives, and the threat of initiatives can
lead legislatures to govern more effectively. 7 1
Informed by the normative debate over the desirability of the
initiative process, there has been a lively scholarly debate over the
appropriate stance courts should take in interpreting constitutional
69. Id. at 41-65. During this period, a disproportionate number of initiatives
were adopted in five states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and
Washington), due in part to the ease of placing such measures on the ballots of those
states. Id. at 51. Many observers trace the revival of the initiative in those states and
elsewhere to the adoption of Proposition 13, the famed anti-tax initiative in
California, in 1978. Id. at 53-55.
70. For overviews and examples of the critical assessment discussed in this
paragraph, see MILLER, supra note 15, at 67-70; Sherman J. Clark, A Populist
Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998); Cooter & Gilbert,
supra note 29, at 697-704; Donald P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose, Win, or Draw? A
Reexamination of Direct Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304
(2007).
71. For examples of the more positive critique, see Todd Donovan et al.,
Political Engagement, Mobilization, and Direct Democracy, 73 PUB. OP. Q. 98
(2009); Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to
Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 463 (2004); James Monogan et al., Public
Opinion, Organized Interests, and Policy Congruence in Initiative and Noninitiative
States, 9 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 304 (2009).
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provisions or statutes enacted by initiative or referenda.7 2 For such
enactments, it appears that most state courts have routinely resorted to
the ordinary tools of construction they use for other enactments, and
do not give special weight to the non-legislative process that led to the
enactment. Precisely given the unique provenance of initiatives, a
number of scholars have suggested different interpretive approaches.
Some have argued that it is difficult to conceptualize voters for
initiatives as having a collective intent; but to do so, courts should go
beyond the text and examine a rich variety of extrinsic sources to
discern such intent, such as media coverage and public opinion polls
taken during the initiative campaign.7 4 Others have suggested these
provisions should be interpreted pursuant to their plain text but, given
that the provisions are meant to diminish the powers of democratic
institutions (i.e., legislatures), they should be narrowly construed and
ambiguities should be, in effect, read against the drafters.75 Still other
scholars contend that, given the acknowledged weaknesses of the
legislative process, the differences between the creation of ordinary
statutes and initiatives has been overplayed, and that ordinary rules of
72. For overviews, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 1101-04; ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 315-34 (2009); Note,
Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2748 (2005); see also
Ethan Lieb, Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referendums, 7 ELECTION L.J. 49
(2008) (arguing that courts should interpret initiatives differently from referendums).
The interpretive issues are to be distinguished from similar issues regarding
constitutional challenges to the products of direct democracy. For an overview, see
MILLER, supra note 15, at 88-98. The latter issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
73. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995). Regarding the ordinary tools of
construction, courts in different states follow different canons of interpretation, but a
recent study found that most state courts follow a "modified textualist rule: first step,
text only; if ambiguity found, then second step, legislative history." Abbe R. Gluck,
The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1844 (2010) (citation
omitted); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 72, at 330 ("A number of state courts have
identified judge-made canons of state constitutional construction that are virtually
identical to statutory interpretation canons . ....
74. Schacter, supra note 73, at 155-64.
75. Philip Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons,
Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477; D. Zachary Hudson, Comment,
Interpreting the Products of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223
(2009).
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construction should be used in interpreting both provisions.7 6
Two state supreme court decisions illustrate how these differing
approaches can be used to interpret mini-DOMAs. The Ohio Supreme
Court in State v. Carswell" confronted the issue of whether Ohio's
second mini-DOMA, enacted by initiative and codified in the state
constitution, rendered unconstitutional a statute that criminalized
domestic violence between unmarried couples. The mini-DOMA
stated neither same-sex marriages nor legal relationships of unmarried
people that approximated different-sex marriage would be
recognized. The court seemed to acknowledge that, at the least, there
was tension between the language of the initiative and the statute,
which arguably recognized a legal status similar to marriage. With
bracing honesty, the court proceeded with the "presumption,
notwithstanding the absence of any empirical data to support it, that
the drafters of the proposed constitutional amendment and the voters
who approved it knew of the domestic-violence statute and that its
purpose is the protection of persons from acts of domestic violence." 79
The court continued that the initiative did not explicitly repeal the
statute, and repeals by implication were not favored.8 0 The court
added a reference to the presumed intent of the voters who supported
the initiative: it was purportedly based on the fear that courts could
declare the statute unconstitutional under the state law, like the
Goodridge decision in Massachusetts, and the "possible effect" of
same-sex marriages celebrated in another state.8 1 A dissenting justice
argued that the text of the initiative should control, and that the court
76. Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy:
Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 322-37
(2003); John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes,
1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 535, 544-45.
77. 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007).
78. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. This provision makes no reference to the
invalidity of an extraterritorial marriage, unlike the earlier-enacted statutory mini-
DOMA, which did. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01. The court made a brief
mention of the latter provision, 871 N.E.2d at 551 n.1, but the decision did not turn
in any way on the presence of the previous enactment.
79. 871 N.E.2d at 549-50.
80. Id. at 550.
81. Id. at 551 n.1. The reference was to an "Editor's Note" of a summary of
the initiative prepared by a state legislative service. Id.
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should not rest "on the supposed intent" of the voters. 82
The Michigan Supreme Court faced a different substantive issue
but similar interpretative choices in National Pride at Work, Inc. v.
Governor.83 Michigan had passed a mini-DOMA by initiative 84 at the
same time as Ohio, and the issue was whether it precluded public
employees who were in same-sex relationships from receiving
domestic partner benefits. Focusing closely on the "plain meaning" of
the constitutional text at the time of the adoption of the initiative,85 the
court answered in the affirmative. The court discounted evidence
during the campaign that the interest groups that supported the
initiative had conceded that it only targeted same-sex marriage, not
domestic partner benefits. Such evidence, the court held, could not be
used to "contradict the unambiguous language of the constitution. "86
A dissenting justice argued that if the common understanding of the
initiative language was the touchstone, then an inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the initiative was
appropriate.87 This was especially true because, in her view, the
initiative was ambiguous with respect to its effect on domestic partner
benefits.8 8 Surveying a wide range of extrinsic sources, the dissent
concluded that the intent of the initiative and its supporters was to
focus solely on invalidating same-sex marriage, and not to address
other matters. 89
What can these differing interpretative approaches tell us about
82. Id. at 556 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). For a recent analysis of the similar
mini-DOMA initiative in Wisconsin, passed at the same time as Ohio's, drawing on
the expressed intent of the supporters of the initiative and reaching the same
conclusion as did the majority in Carswell, see McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783
N.W.2d 855, 869 & n.22 (Wis. 2010).
83. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
84. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
85. 748 N.W.2d at 533.
86. Id. at 540.
87. Id. at 545 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 548 n.34. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 545-52 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Gluck, supra note 73, at
1807-08 & n.217 (discussing recent debates among Justices on the Michigan
Supreme Court regarding the propriety of going beyond textual analysis, citing
National Pride at Work, among other cases); Darrell A.H. Miller, State DOMAs,
Neutral Principles, and the Mdbius of State Action, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 967, 983-84
(2008) (discussing different approaches of the Ohio and Michigan cases).
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the interpretation of mini-DOMAs concerning the recognition of
extraterritorial marriages? Consider first the situation when a statutory
mini-DOMA does refer to an extraterritorial same-sex marriage, and
the subsequent initiative does not. 90 Under a strict textualist approach,
like the Michigan court, the initiative should not be interpreted to
apply to extraterritorial marriage. In contrast, an approach willing to
go beyond the text and consider broader evidence of presumed
intent-like that taken by the Carswell court-could reach the
conclusion that, despite the silence, the initiative was meant to apply
to such marriages. 91 The latter approach might also lead to the
conclusion that the initiative was meant to codify and constitutionalize
the earlier (albeit somewhat differently worded) statute. Perhaps
choosing an approach does not make much difference, because in
either case it could be argued that the later initiative does not repeal
the earlier statute, and they can have simultaneous legal effect. A
venerable interpretative canon of construction, long-accepted by
federal and state courts, is that implied repeals are not favored. 92 The
second wave of mini-DOMAs, by text and apparently by intent, did
not purport to expressly repeal or limit the first wave of mini-DOMAs.
The curious differences in the language between some of the mini-
DOMAs in the same states are unlikely to be considered
inconsistent.9 3 To put the same point another way, the second wave of
mini-DOMAs do not expressly (i.e., textually) preempt the first wave.
The second wave do not appear to impliedly preempt the first wave
either; though, to fully support that conclusion, one would presumably
90. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Knight v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 4th 14, 20 (Cal. App.
2005) (interpreting, albeit with little discussion, California mini-DOMA, enacted by
initiative and with no reference to extraterritorial marriage, to apply to such
marriages); Banks v. Jennings, 920 N.E.2d 432, 437-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Fain,
J., concurring) (discussing public policy exception to choice of law rules, and
suggesting in dicta that the mini-DOMA enacted by initiative in Ohio applies to an
extraterritorial marriage).
92. ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 1081-1100 (discussing cases).
93. For another example of harmonization involving a mini-DOMA, see
Knight, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 25 (statute establishing same-sex domestic partnerships
did not conflict with mini-DOMA passed by initiative, since the unambiguous
language of the latter, without needing resort to indicia of voter's intent, was only
concerned with the "status of marriage, and not with the rights of obligations
associated with marriage.").
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need to consult extrinsic evidence in each state regarding the intent of
the drafters and supporters (including voters) of those provisions.94
Next, consider a state with only one mini-DOMA that makes no
mention of extraterritorial same-sex marriages. 95 A strictly textual
approach to interpretation would seem to exclude coverage of such
marriages. A nontextualist approach could proceed on the basis that
extrinsic sources of voters' intent might reveal that coverage of same-
sex marriages from other states was intended. The presence or
strength of such extrinsic evidence could vary among states. The lack
of a prior, statutory mini-DOMA in this instance could make the task
more difficult, since it could not be argued that the initiative was
constitutionalizing a statute that did have explicit extraterritorial
effect.
D. The Absence of Mini-DOMS and Judicial Decisions as
Clear Statements
In two states with no mini-DOMA, the highest courts have held
that there is no state constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 96 in
Rhode Island, one state with no mini-DOMA, the supreme court has
not addressed the issue of the validity of same-sex marriage. How
should these states apply the public policy exception to the celebration
of marriage rule? Granted, it is axiomatic that a mere difference in the
law is not enough to demonstrate that it would violate the "strong
public policy" of the forum by recognizing a foreign marriage, invalid
in the forum. But when the most authoritative judicial expositor of
94. A result different from that suggested in the text would follow if clear
statement canons of construction with respect to extraterritorial effect of statutes, see
supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text, were applied to state constitutional
provisions (like the second wave of mini-DOMAs) as well. To be sure, we
ordinarily do not apply canons of interpretation for statutes to constitutional
provisions. But state statutes and constitutions (unlike most federal statutes and the
U.S. Constitution) have many similarities with regard to length and detail, and state
constitutions are far easier to amend than the federal constitution. Devins, supra note
53, at 1640-43. In these circumstances, it seems appropriate to construe state statutes
and state constitutions in similar ways. Cf WILLIAMS, supra note 72, at 330-34
(comparing interpretation of state constitutions and state statutes).
95. See supra note 27.
96. The states are New York (Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y.
2006)) and New Jersey (Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)).
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state law squarely holds (albeit in an intrastate context) that there is no
right to same-sex marriage, it would seem to follow that there is a
strong public policy in the forum. It is not as blunt as a mini-DOMA,
explicitly referring to extraterritorial marriages, but traditionally a
state supreme court decision can be given significant weight to
determine if there is a strong public policy of the forum in place.9 7
A different approach, giving apparent primacy to the presence or
absence of a mini-DOMA, is Godfrey v. Spano.9 8 Earlier, the New
York Court of Appeals held there was no state constitutional right to
same-sex marriage.99 In Godfrey, the same court considered a
challenge by taxpayers to executive orders by county officials, which
for purposes of public benefits eligibility recognized same-sex
marriages validly celebrated outside of New York. The plaintiffs
argued that the earlier decision precluded recognition of
extraterritorial same-sex marriages.100 The majority found that the
taxpayers lacked a basis under state law to challenge the orders and
dismissed the case. 101
A concurring opinion reached the merits of the taxpayers'
challenge. It observed that the earlier decision did not address choice
of law issues, and drew on the May 's Estate case to determine if the
foreign marriage could be recognized.10 2 It noted that many states had
passed mini-DOMAs, addressing foreign same-sex marriages, but
New York had not done so. Indeed, mini-DOMAs had "been
introduced at every legislative session since 1998, but not one ha[d]
been reported out of committee." 0 3 Since positive law was lacking as
a basis for the exception, the concurring opinion acknowledged that
the court could draw on "decisional law, as well as from 'prevailing
social and moral attitudes of the community."' 04 Thus, the concurring
97. In discussing the application of the public policy exception to the place of
celebration rule, the Second Restatement seems to give the most jurisprudential
weight to state statutes, but also refers to "judicial precedent" from the forum on
point. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283, cmt. k (1971).
98. 920 N.E.2d 328 (N.Y. 2009).
99. See supra note 96.
100. Godfrey, 920 N.E.2d at 332-33.
101. Id. at 334-37.
102. Id. at 337-39 (Ciparick, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 338 n.I (Caparick, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 339 (Caparick, J., concurring) (quoting Intercontinental Hotels
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opinion argued that other developments in New York decisional and
statutory law, such as recognition of same-sex partners as family
members in various contexts, "express a public policy of acceptance
that is simply not compatible with plaintiffs' argument that the
recognition" of a foreign same-sex marriage "is contrary to New York
public policy."10 5
It's tempting to agree with the result, if not necessarily the
reasoning of the concurring opinion, in Godfrey. It can be argued that
for public policy exception purposes, state statutes and judicial
decisions should be treated the same. 106 A court decision concerned
with intrastate issues will typically say nothing about its
extraterritorial effect, and likewise will lack any clear statement to that
effect. Ultimately, the concurring opinion in Godfrey reads the public
policy exception too narrowly. For one thing, it gives too much weight
to the failure of New York to pass a mini-DOMA. Another venerable
maxim of statutory interpretation holds that the failure of introduced
legislation, which would have addressed an issue, to be enacted should
not be given weight, since bills may fail to pass for many reasons, not
necessarily because of rejection of the merits of the proposal. 107
For another, it would drain the exception of vitality if (at least)
state supreme court decisions do not count as a strong public policy.
To critics of the exception, this would no doubt be an acceptable
result. I do not agree. It is unreasonable to insist that court decisions
"clearly state," or state at all, their extraterritorial effect when that is
not at issue in the case. In contrast, it is not unreasonable, as I argued
above, to insist that legislators clearly state any extraterritorial effect
of statutes normally assumed to be for domestic consumption.
Legislators have broader drafting prerogatives than judges drafting
decisions. Among other things, legislation is typically prospective in
nature, while court decisions are typically retrospective.'os This is not
to say that a court cannot consider other factors when addressing the
scope of the public policy exception in a particular case. The
Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964)).
105. Id. at 381 (Caparick, J., concurring).
106. Simson, supra note 5, at 318 n.13.
107. ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, at 1026.
108. Id. at 649-88 (discussing presumptive canons in favor of statutory
prospectivity and judicial retroactivity).
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concurring opinion in Godfrey discussed factors it considered relevant
to the public stance of New York with respect to same-sex marriage,
other than the decision against such marriages by the state high court.
But in my view, the absence of a mini-DOMA alone is not
determinative on the possibility of state courts applying the public
policy exception, and state supreme court decisions against same-sex
marriage alone can be a sufficient reason to invoke the exception.' 09
CONCLUSION
My analysis is a relatively limited one, as I am only examining the
legal regimes in those states that do not have a mini-DOMA that
explicitly refers to extraterritorial same-sex marriages, or states
without a mini-DOMA that have by court decision not recognized
such marriages. Nor am I positing a general theory of choice of law
for marriage recognition, or of the public policy exception.
Nonetheless, after much ferment in the 1990s and 2000s, the various
forms of mini-DOMAs appear to be here to stay, and appear unlikely
to be modified in the near term. Courts, then, will inevitably face
some of the jurisprudential issues I address. My principal contention is
that mini-DOMAs should not be presumed to affect the recognition of
extraterritorial same-sex marriages, unless they explicitly so state. In
facing the question of recognizing foreign marriages, courts do not
always slavishly follow the place of celebration rule. Instead, courts
will likely consider (explicitly or implicitly) the citizenship of the
couple at the time of the marriage," 0 the identity of the party
109. In their analysis of conflict of laws and competitive federalism, O'Hara
and Ribstein argue that state legislatures, not state courts, are better positioned to
explicitly place limits on the party choice-of-law they advocate. O'Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 51. Judges, they argue, are typically elected and, due to that and other
reasons, may be subject to pressure to limit individual choice of law that may evade
forum law. Id. at 1158, 1160. "Legislative determinations," they argue elsewhere,
"are superior to judicial ones because they are more likely to provide notice to
parties [and] are more likely to be subject to powerful interest group opposition if
they are inefficient." Id. at 1196. This analysis would seem to exclude state court
decisions from being considered as sources of the public policy exception to the
place of celebration rule, as they suggest in their discussion of same-sex marriage.
Id. at 1209-10. These arguments are not without force, but I think they overstate the
supposed deficiencies of court decision-making regarding inefficient deference to
forum law.
110. For example, my suggested analysis might turn on whether
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contesting the validity of the marriage and for what reason, and the
connections that the forum has with the marriage and the parties to it,
among other things."' For recognition of same-sex marriages, the
presence or absence of mini-DOMAs will be a factor as well, perhaps
a determinative one, and the clear statement rule of construction here
advocated is the best path for courts to take when applying those
provisions.
APPENDIX: STATE MINI-DOMAs
The following is a compilation of the principle statutes and
constitutional provisions in each state (if any), that, in some manner,
forbid or invalidate same-sex marriage. Footnote 23 contains the
sources for these provisions, and these sources also contain the
language of the provisions. An asterisk follows the provision if it does
not have language that can reasonably be construed as a clear
statement against the validity of a same-sex marriage celebrated
outside the enacting jurisdiction. I have also briefly quoted language
from a provision that, in my view, does indicate that it was intended to
have extraterritorial effect. Excluded are those states which had
provisions at one point but have been superseded by state statutes (i.e.,
New Hampshire, Vermont) or supreme court decisions (i.e.,
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts) establishing a right to same-sex
marnage.
Alabama
ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis 1998) (passed 1998) (refers to
marriage "as a result of the law of any jurisdiction").
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03 (passed 2006).*
extraterritorial same-sex marriage recognition is sought in a state not recognizing
such marriages, when the partners were not citizens of the state when they were
married elsewhere, and hence were not trying to evade state law. MICHAEL H.
HOFFHEIMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 400 (2010)
(discussing this situation).
111. For discussion of these factors in the context of recognizing same-sex
marriage, see Kramer, supra note 32, at 1970-71; Linda Silberman, Same-Sex
Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2214
(2005); Simson, supra note 5, at 337-51; Wolff, supra note 5,passim.
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Alaska
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2008) (passed 1996) (refers to
marriage from "another state or foreign jurisdiction").
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25 (passed 1999).*
Arizona
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-112 (2007) (passed 1996) (refers to
marriages "in another state or country").
ARiz. CONST. art. XXX, § 1 (passed 2008).*
Arkansas
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, 9-11-208 (2008) (passed 1997)
(refers to marriages from "another state" or "a foreign jurisdiction).
ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 1 (passed 2004).*
California
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (passed
2000).*
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (passed 2008).*
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (passed 2009)
(refers to marriages outside of California).
Colorado
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2010) (passed 2000) (refers to
marriages contracted "outside this state").
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 (passed 2006).*
Delaware
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2009) (passed 1996) (refers to
marriages obtained "outside the State").
Florida
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2010) (passed 1997) (refers to
marriages "entered into in any jurisdiction, whether within or outside
the State of Florida").
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (passed 2008).*
Georgia
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (West 2010) (passed 1996) (refers to
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marriages issued "by another state or foreign jurisdiction").
GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, para. 1 (passed 2004) (refers to marriage
from another "state or jurisdiction").
Hawaii
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2006) (passed 1994).*
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (passed 1998).*
Idaho
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-209 (2006) (passed 1996) (refers to
"marriages contracted without this state").
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 (passed 2006).*
Illinois
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (West 1999) (passed 1996).*
Indiana
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008) (passed 1997) (refers to
marriage solemnized in a "place" other than Indiana).
Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (2007) (passed 1996) (refers to
"marriages contracted without this state").
KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16 (passed 2005).*
Kentucky
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (West 2006) (passed 1998)
(refers to marriage "in another state").
KY. CONST. § 233A (passed 2004).*
Louisiana
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (1999 & Supp. 2009) (passed 1988)
(refers to marriage "contracted in another state").
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (passed 2004) (refers to marriage
contracted "in any other jurisdiction").
Maine
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (1998 & Supp. 2009)
(passed 1997) (refers to "marriages performed in another state").
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Maryland
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006) (passed
1984).*
Michigan
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West 2005) (passed 1996)
(refers to marriages "solemnized in another state").
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (passed 2004).*
Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008) (passed
1997) (refers to marriages "recognized by another state").
Mississippi
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (West 2007) (passed 1997) (refers to
marriage "valid in another jurisdiction").
MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 236A (passed 2004) (refers to "marriage
in another state or foreign jurisdiction").
Missouri
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003) (passed 2001) (same-sex
marriage "will not be recognized for any purpose in this state even
when valid where recognized").
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 33 (passed 2004).*
Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2009) (passed 1997).*
MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (passed 2004).*
Nebraska
NEB. CONST. art. I, §29 (passed 2000).*
Nevada
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (passed 2002).*
North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2009) (passed 1995) (refers to
marriages "performed outside" of state).
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North Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 (2009) (passed 2000) (refers to
marriages contracted "in another state").
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (passed 2004).*
Ohio
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2005) (passed 2004)
(refers to marriages entered into "in any other jurisdiction").
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (passed 2004).*
Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West 2001) (passed 1996) (refers
to marriage "performed in another state").
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 (passed 2004) (refers to marriages
"performed in another state").
Oregon
OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (passed 2004).*
Pennsylvania
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2010) (passed 1996)
(refers to marriages "entered into in another state or foreign
jurisdiction").
South Carolina
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (1985 & Supp. 2009) (passed 1996).*
S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (passed 2006) (refers to marriages
from another state).
South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (2004) (passed 1996).*
S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9 (passed 2006).*
Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2005) (passed 1996) (refers to
marriages from "another state or foreign jurisdiction").
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (passed 2006) (refers to marriage from
another state).
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Texas
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (West 2006) (passed 2003) (refers
to marriage from "any other jurisdiction").
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (passed 2005).*
Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (LexisNexis 2007) (passed 1996)
(refers to marriage from "any other country, state, or territory").
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (passed 2004).*
Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2004) (passed 1997) (refers to
marriage entered into "in another state or jurisdiction").
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (passed 2006).*
Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (West 2005) (passed 1998)
(refers to marriage from "another jurisdiction").
West Virginia
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (LexisNexis 2004) (passed 2001)
(refers to marriage "of any other state").
Wisconsin
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.001(2) (West 2009) (passed 1959) (defines
marriage as being between "a husband and wife").
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (West 2009) (passed 1959) (marriage
evasion statute).
WIS. CONST. art. III, § 13 (passed 2006).*
Wyoming
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2009) (passed 1977).*
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